The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value
Jerry L. Mashawt
In this article, Professor Mashaw examines and criticizes the
Supreme Court's most recent attempt, in Mathews v. Eldridge, to
formulate a due process calculus for administrative adjudication.
According to Mashaw the failure of the Eldridge calculus is its emphasis on questions of technique rather than on questions of value.
The Court, he proposes, should be systematically concerned with the
variousalternativevalue theories that the due process clause reflects.
Finally, Mashaw indicates the contributionthat such concerns might
have made to the Eldridge analysis and to due process review in
general.
During the 1970s the Supreme Court has undertaken an intensive review of administrative hearing procedures for conformity with
constitutional requirements of due process of law.' The landmark
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I wish to thank J. Kevin Buster for research
assistance in the documentation of this article and Bruce Ackerman, Owen Fiss, Bill Nelson,
Warren Schwartz, and Paul Verkuil for helpful comments on a prior draft. Full responsibility
for the article's content is, of course, my own.
The Court's recent intensive involvement with administrative hearing processes began
about 1969 and includes: Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (bias in hearing before state
board of medical examiners); Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419
U.S. 281 (1974) (lack of opportunity to offer contrary presentation of evidence in ICC hearing
for issuance of "certificate of public convenience and necessity"); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974) (procedural irregularities in prison disciplinary hearing); Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (lack of notice and hearing prior to seizure
of yacht by Puerto Rican transportation officials); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)
(lack of hearing prior to employment termination of government employee); Weinberger v.
Hymson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973) (lack of hearing prior to the Food
and Drug Administration's withdrawal of a "new drug application"); Gagnuon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778 (1973) (lack of hearing prior to probation revocation); Oibson-v-Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564 (1973) (lack of impartial hearing officers in hearings before state optometry board);
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (lack of hearing prior to employment termination
of state employee); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (lack of hearing prior to
employment termination of state employee); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (lack
of hearing in parole revocation); Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208 (1972) (lack of opportunity to offer oral evidence and to cross-examine witnesses in hearing concerning termination
of disability benefits); Connll y_.Hi~1hatham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971) (lack of hearing prior
to employment termination of government employee); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)
(lack of hearing prior to suspension of driver's license); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(1971) (admission of unsworn written medical reports as evidence at hearing for eligibility
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case of Goldberg v. Kelly 2 in 1970 confirmed the Court's unwillingness to limit its review by traditional notions of property interests
and also suggested, in its specification of the constitutionally requisite elements of adjudicatory procedure, that the Court was prepared to assume a highly interventionist posture. What followed was
a "due process revolution"-a flood of cases seeking to extend, or
3
simply to apply, Goldberg's precepts.
The basic task that this burgeoning due process case load has
presented to the courts has been to give content to the requirements
of due process while maintaining an appropriate judicial role in the
design of administrative procedures. Although Goldberg may have
indicated the Court's willingness to impose a detailed model of requisite adjudicatory procedure upon a particular administrative
function, no recent Supreme Court has believed that a single model
is readily and consistently applicable to all administrative functions. What is required, therefore, are general criteria for review that
will lend consistency and principle to the Court's decisions while
permitting different administrative functions to be reviewed on
their own terms. At the same time, those general criteria should be
sufficiently concrete to structure administrative behavior without
resort to a judicial test of every procedure that lacks some element
of the paradigm process advanced in Goldberg.
In the Court's latest attempt to formulate this due process calculus, Mathews v. Eldridge,4 Justice Powell's majority opinion articulates a set of criteria with a comprehensiveness that suggests a
preliminary integration of the Court's recent efforts.5 In the majorfor disability benefits); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (lack of hearing prior
to public posting of names of people deemed unfit to consume alcoholic beverages); Rowan
v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (procedural irregularities in scheme
for hearings concerning mail violations); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970) (lack
of hearing prior to termination of old-age benefits); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(lack of hearing prior to termination of public assistance benefits); Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U.S. 411 (1969) (cross-examination deficiencies in state commission hearings on possible
violations of criminal laws relating to labor-management relations).
2 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
In addition to the many Supreme Court cases, see note 1 supra, hundreds of cases have
been decided by the lower federal courts.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
5 Eldridge may also represent a turning point in the Court's resolution of procedural due
process issues. Since Eldridge,plaintiffs in due process cases have been uniformly unsuccessful, and a marked tendency has emerged to avoid "balancing" analysis by finding the due
process clause inapplicable. Montamye v. Haymes, 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976) (lack of hearing prior
to transfer of prison inmates); Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976) (lack of hearing prior
to transfer of prison inmates); Bishop v. Wood, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976) (lack of hearing prior to
employment termination of city policemen); Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976) (lack of
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ity's words, from which there is no dissent,' the Court must con-

sider:
first, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
addi7
entail.
would
requisites
procedural
substitute
or
tional
Although this functional formulation impliedly invites an intrusive,
particularistic review and specification of procedures, it is tempered
by judicial restraint. "In assessing what process is due in this case,
substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgment of the
individuals charged by Congress with the administration of the social welfare system that the procedure they have provided assure
8
fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals."
The thesis of this article is that the Eldridge approach is unsatisfactory both as employed in that case and as a general formulation of due process review of administrative procedures. The failing
of Eldridge is its focus on questions of technique rather than on
questions of value. That focus, it is argued, generates an inquiry
that is incomplete because unresponsive to the full range of concerns
embodied in the due process clause.
After examining Mathews v. Eldridge and criticizing the
Court's application of the due process calculus which it advances,
the article considers the contribution that systematic attention to
alternative theories of due process values might have made to that
analysis. Ultimately the plea is for a reorientation of judicial review
of administrative procedure that would substitute a systematic concern with value for the intuitive functionalism of the Eldridge opinion. The argument is that this approach would be more consonant
with accepted constitutional principles and with the Court's historic
role as defender of constitutionally assured individual liberty.
hearing prior to distribution of list of names of people charged but not convicted of shoplifting).
Although Justice Brennan questioned the application of these criteria to the facts, he
refrained from questioning the criteria themselves. 424 U.S. 319, 349-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 212 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
424 U.S. at 335.
'Id. at 349.
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I. MATHEWS v. ELDRIDGE
A.

The Disability Determination Process

The plaintiff George Eldridge first filed an application for disability benefits with the defendant Social Security Administration
(SSA) on March 10, 1967. His claim was processed through an adjudicatory system which is massive9 and complex-and increasingly
unmanageable. ° The complexity of the system can be attributed to
two factors: first, the problematic statutory definition of "disabil' The massiveness of the social security disability claims process is difficult to appreciate. For fiscal year 1975, the state agencies processed 1,230,200 initial determinations of
disability and 221,800 reconsideration decisions. OFFE OF MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATION,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SSA FACTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975 (OAAP Pub. No. 006
(2-76) 1976). For the same year there were 75,400 hearings held before administrative law
judges. Id. In 1972, George Eldridge would have been one of 1,832,916 disabled workers
receiving social security disability benefits and one of about 38,000 such workers whose

benefits were terminated during that year due to recovery. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, 313, 347 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT]. The system is so big that reliable data about it are
difficult to obtain.
This same administrative system now processes Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
claims. Supplemental Security Income for Aged, Blind, or Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385
(1974). (SSI federalized state old age, aid to the blind, and permanent and total disability
programs.) Also, the system temporarily included "black lung" decisions under the 1972
Amendments to the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-902,
921-924, 931-934, 936-940, 951 (Supp. I, 1972).
'1 A 1974 staff report to the House Committee on Ways and Means on the disability
insurance program concluded that there was "a substantial question. . . whether the multitiered Social Security appeals procedure can withstand the current workload under social
security and SSI, even if the present Black Lung situation is only a temporary aberration."
STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 5. The fear was that the system was reaching a scale at which
its complexity would render it unmanageable.
The apparently fragile condition of the Social Security Administration's hearings and
appeals process strongly influenced the Government's petition for certiorari in Eldridge. In
his petition the Solicitor General stated that
under the current administrative procedures governing determination of social security
disability benefits, the Secretary presently terminates the benefits of approximately
87,600 disability beneficiaries (and their dependents) each year because their disabilities
are found to have ceased. Of these terminations, fewer than 2,400 per year proceed to
the post termination oral evidentiary hearings provided under current procedures. In the
Secretary's judgment the court of appeals' holding that Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, requires the disability beneficiary to be afforded oral evidentiary hearings prior to termination, if allowed to stand will severely tax the capacity of the Social Security Administration to conduct an effective disability program, and will result in substantial losses to
the social security trust fund.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The trust
fund, at current funding levels, is projected to be exhausted some time in 1979 and to have a
deficit of nearly 9 billion dollars by 1982. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., DISABILITY INSURANCE-LEGIsLATIVE ISSUE
PAPER 2 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as DISABILITY INSURANCE-LEGISLATIE ISSUE
PAPER].
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ity" and, second, the division of labor among a variety of administrative bodies-(1) the Bureau of Disability Insurance of the SSA,
(2) state vocational and rehabilitation agencies, (3) administrative
law judges, and (4) the Appeals Council of the SSA.
The statutory definition of disability requires that a worker
demonstrate his "inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has
lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than 12 months . . ... , To satisfy that test the worker bears a
continuing burden of showing by means of "medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" 2 that his impairment
is of such severity that he is unable not only to do his previous work
but,
considering his age, education, and work experience, [to] engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists
in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific
job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he
applied for work.13
Except to the extent that the Social Security Administration has by
regulation designated certain impairments as per se disabilities,' 4
the effect of a medical impairment on functional capacity for employment must be evaluated in light of various nonmedical factors."
This elaborate determination is made through the following
sequence of procedures. 6 First an applicant applies at a district
office of the SSA. There a claims official determines, on the basis
of the claimant's prior earnings and contributions to the Social Security system, whether he is eligible for Social Security benefits.
The case is then referred to a state agency,' 7 usually the state voca" 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (1970).
12 Id.

§ 423(d)(3).

' Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).

20 C.F.R. §§ 204.1502(a), (c) (1976).
, It has been argued that the Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security
Income programs draw unwarranted distinctions among classes of disabled persons for purposes of making social welfare payments. See Liebman, The Definitionof Disabilityin Social
Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawingthe Bounds of Social Welfare Estates,
89 HAav. L. REV. 833 (1976). For a fuller description of the application of the disability test,
"

see R. DixoN, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AND MASS JUSTICE 54-57 (1973).

,6 The sequence of procedures which applies to both acceptance for benefits and termination is described in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.901-.990 (1976).
,1 The involvement of state agencies seems peculiar since both benefits and administration are financed entirely by federal funds. However, Congress decided at the inception of
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tional and rehabilitation service, where an adjudication unit composed of a doctor and a lay "vocational specialist" develops medical
and vocational evidence and makes an initial decision on the claim.
If the state agency denies the claim and the SSA affirms that denial,
the claimant is notified that he is entitled to a de novo reconsideration of his claim by the state agency. If a reconsideration is requested, the claim is reviewed by a different state agency unit.
Should the claim again be denied, the claimant is informed
that he is entitled to a de novo hearing before an administrative law
judge appointed pursuant to the federal Administrative Procedure
Act. The administrative law judge is usually the first person to
decide the case who has seen the claimant or heard any oral testimony or argument. If the claimant loses before the administrative
law judge, he is entitled to request discretionary review by the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration.'" If the Appeals
Council dismisses the request or denies the claim on the merits, the
claimant may then seek judicial review in a federal district court.
At every stage prior to judicial review the record remains open and
the claimant may adduce new evidence.
In order to ensure continued beneficiary eligibility, disability
awards are reviewed periodically by an adjudication unit within the
state agency. The procedures for the termination of benefits are
essentially the same as those for the initial determination of eligibility, except that the state unit rather than the claimant initiates the
process.' 9 Once the initial state unit recommendation has been reviewed and accepted by an examiner in the SSA Bureau of
Disability Insurance, benefits are terminated effective two months
after the month in which medical recovery is determined to have
occurred. The beneficiary is notified of termination at the time he
is notified of his right to a de novo reconsideration by a different
state unit. If the beneficiary prevails at any stage after benefits have
been terminated, he is entitled to retroactive payments. 2" Alternatively, the Secretary of HEW has a statutory right under certain
conditions to recover payments which are later determined to be
2
illegitimate. '
the disability program that it should be connected with vocational rehabilitation programs
that are carried on primarily by the states. Presumably this procedure would have determinations made by persons who were experienced with both medical and vocational factors relevant to disability insurance and also would attach the claimant immediately to a system
which would screen him for referral to vocational rehabilitation programs.
The Appeals Council sits in Arlington, Virginia.
" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335-39 (1976).
20 42 U.S.C. § 404 (1970); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.501, .503-.504 (1976).
21 42 U.S.C. § 404 (1970). See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.501-.515 (1976).
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The Plaintiff: George Eldridge

George Eldridge's experience exemplifies the operation of the
foregoing sequence of procedures.22 After Eldridge first filed an application, a state agency review team in Virginia found him not to
be disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. He requested a reconsideration, which affirmed the prior finding. He then
filed a request for a hearing. The hearing examiner found Eldridge
disabled and ordered disability insurance benefits paid to him. Notice of this award was sent to Eldridge in June 1968, accompanied
by a statement that his claim would be reexamined in one year
because by that time he might show a medical improvement justifying termination of the benefits. In 1969, accordingly, Eldridge's
claim was reexamined, and in February 1970 the SSA determined
that his disability had ceased and suspended his benefits. Eldridge
requested a reconsideration of this determination. He also filed suit
in federal district court, alleging that the SSA's failure to provide
him with a hearing prior to the suspension of his benefits violated
due process. The court ordered that payments be continued pending
its decision. Meanwhile, the SSA affirmed the state agency's reconsideration decision sustaining the prior determination against
Eldridge. Eldridge requested a hearing, and in March 1971 the
hearing examiner found that his disability had not ceased. Shortly
thereafter the district court suit was dismissed as moot.
In March 1972 the Virginia agency responsible for processing
Social Security disability awards sent Eldridge a form letter and
questionnaire concerning the current condition of his disability.2
Eldridge completed this questionnaire and returned it to the state
agency indicating that in his opinion he had not improved. The
state agency received medical reports from Eldridge's treating physician and from a psychiatric consultant. On May 16, 1972, Eldridge
received a letter from the state agency stating, with reasons, that
22 The following description draws on the Supreme Court's statement of facts in Mathews
v. Eldridge, the district court opinion in that case, 361 F. Supp. 520 (W.D. Va. 1974), and
the petition for certiorari and the briefs filed in the Supreme Court.
The questionnaire was Form 454a, which asks the claimant: (1) whether he feels his
medical condition is improved so that he can return to work; (2) whether his doctor has told
him that he is able to return to work; (3) whether the doctor has placed significant restrictions on the kind of work he may do or the hours he may work; (4) to describe in functional
terms the sort of limitations on lifting, bending, pushing, and so on that interfere with his
work; (5) to list the name of any treating physician, hospital, or clinic; (6) whether he has
worked in the past 12 months, if so how much, and if not why not; (7) whether he is receiving
vocational rehabilitation services; and (8) whether he has any additional information that
he believes might be important in reviewing his continuing entitlement to social security
disability benefits.
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the medical evidence in his case indicated that he was able to work
as of May 1972. The letter also stated that benefits would terminate
after July 1972 if the agency's finding were affirmed by the SSA, but
that a reasonable time would be granted him to obtain and submit
additional information. 2 Eldridge responded to this letter as follows:
In regards to your letter of May 16, 1972 asking for more evidence to prove my disability, I think you should already have
enough evidence in my files to prove the disability already.
Besides if I was able to work I would have worked because if I
was able to work I could make more money than social security
paid me. Another thing, if you will check my reports a little
closer I think you will find that I have arthritis of the spine
rather than a strained back as you stated in your letter. The
people at the disability section in Richmond have never made
a yes decision in my case, I have always had to have a hearing
in order to get the decision made properly. Even at the last
hearing that was held in my case I had to employ an attorney,
and the examiner made his decision wholly in my favor and
stated in his decision for me for my checks to continue without
interruption. So go ahead and make your own decision in the
case, I know I'm not able to work, if I ever get able to work I
will, I will get by some way without the social security even
2
though I've paid into it while I was able to work. 1
In June the SSA affirmed the state agency's finding that Eldridge's
disability had ceased and, accordingly, that benefits should terminate after July 1972. Eldridge was notified of this determination on
July 7, and was advised of his right to request a reconsideration
within six months.
In August Eldridge again filed suit, alleging that the Secretary
2

The letter states in part:

You were initially found to be disabled due to chronic anxiety and back strain. In
addition you have been found to have diabetes. Medical evidence shows no significant
motional limitation of your back which would impose severe functional restrictions.
Diabetes is under control and no complications have been noted, secondary to this.
Although you remain somewhat anxious, there are no indications of continued emotional
problems of sufficient severity to preclude all work for which you are qualified.
Therefore, disability benefits being paid on your social security number may be
stopped unless additional evidence is submitted which shows that you are still unable
to work because of your impairment.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7 n.5, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
11Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13-14, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976).
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of HEW, in whose name Social Security determinations are made,
had no authority to stop his benefit payments without first affording
him an opportunity to be heard. The gist of Eldridge's argument
was that his experience clearly showed that he could not get a proper
determination on his disability claim except at an oral hearing before a hearing examiner (now called an administrative law judge).
C.

The State of the Jurisprudence

Mathews v. Eldridge represents the Supreme Court's first full
dress opinion on the pretermination administrative procedures of a
social welfare system since Goldberg v. Kelly.2 1 Indeed the Court
had studiously avoided determining how Goldberg applied to other
social welfare programs such as unemployment compensation benefits27 and workman's compensation benefits; 28 and in Richardson v.
Wright 29 in 1972, the Court had refused to decide a prior hearing
claim involving termination of Social Security disability benefits on
the ground that HEW had promulgated new regulations pending
review-the regulations at issue in Eldridge.
The Court's resolution in the Eldridge case-against George
Eldridge-was difficult to predict on the basis of earlier due process
decisions. The Court had often emphasized the flexibility of its
approach to due process and the necessity of evaluating each claim
virtually on its own facts.1 Furthermore, as the multiple opinions
in Arnett v. Kennedy" demonstrate, the Court had seemingly developed two lines of due process jurisprudence. One line suggested a
presumption in favor of prior evidentiary hearings: the deprivation
of any substantial interest prior to an opportunity for hearing would
have to be justified by some reasonably compelling governmental
necessity. 2 The other line seemed to reverse that presumption: sum397 U.S. 254 (1970).
" See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975); Indiana Employment Security Div. v.
Burney, 409 U.S. 540 (1973); Tocres v. New York Dep't of Labor, 405 U.S. 949 (1972);
California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971). See also Christian
v. New York Dep't of Labor, 414 U.S. 614 (1974).
11 Dillard v. Industrial Comm'n, 414 U.S. 1110 (1974), aff'g 347 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. Va.
1972).
- 405 U.S. 208 (1972).
30 E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
31416 U.S. 134 (1974).
32 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Friendly Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See also
Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260 U.S. 386 (1922); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922);
Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701 (1884); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586
(1880).
26
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mary process that preliminarily disposed of property or other inter-

for a hearests was acceptable, provided there was later opportunity
33
ing that might lead to a reinstatement of the interest.
A reconciliation of these two lines of due process jurisprudence
was nevertheless quite feasible. In the cases requiring prior hearing,
with the exception of Goldberg, there had been no notice or opportunity to contest of any kind before adverse administrative action
was taken; and the Court in those cases was not required to reach
the issue of what form of prior procedure would satisfy due process.
On the other hand, almost all of the cases permitting summary
action without hearing involved a governmental necessity or emergency. Standing between these lines of cases Eldridge, like Goldberg, posed the question whether a full evidentiary hearing was required prior to the divestiture of a substantial interest when some
opportunity to contest had been provided and no overriding governmental interest in summary process was apparent. In upholding the
Social Security Administration's termination procedures, therefore,
the Supreme Court may have determined that the Goldberg situation was unique.
II.

THE DUE PROCESS CALCULUS AS APPLIED IN
MATHEWS

A.

v.

ELDRIDGE

The Private Interest

Because the SSA makes retroactive payments when it reinstates a recipient after a hearing, the Eldridge Court articulated the
plaintiff's substantive interest as an interest merely "in the uninterrupted receipt of his source of income pending final administrative
decision of his claim." The Court conceded that this was the same
interest as that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg v. Kelly, but it
then distinguished the Eldridge facts on the ground that Goldberg
had involved an income maintenance scheme of last resort for those
in financial need, while the Social Security disability system in
Eldridge made payments to the disabled irrespective of financial
3
necessity. 1
' Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Lichter v. United States,
334 U.S. 742 (1948); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301
U.S. 183 (1937); Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393 (1934); United States v. Illinois Cent.
R.R., 291 U.S. 457 (1934); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Coffin Bros. & Co.
v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921); Wells Fargo v. Nevada,
248 U.S. 165 (1918); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904); Lawton v. Steele,
152 U.S. 133 (1894); Walston v. Nevin, 128 U.S. 578 (1888); Kentucky R.R. Tax Cases, 115
U.S. 321 (1885).
11 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340-41 (1976).
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Justice Powell conceded that "[although] the potential deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in Goldberg . . .the
degree of difference can be overstated. 3 5 He went on to note that
the possible length of wrongful deprivation is one consideration in
judging the impact of official action on private interests and that
the Social Security hearing process, which now disposes of claims
more than a year after a hearing request, is "torpid." 6 The Court
also noted the typically modest resources of a physically disabled
worker 37 and the significant possibility that ineligibility for federal
disability payments would also render a recipient ineligible for the
most logical welfare program, Supplemental Security Income (SSI),
which uses the same definition of disability. Notwithstanding these
observations, however, the Court concluded that since a disability
recipient might have access to private resources and other forms of
government assistance beyond those normally available to welfare
recipients like the one in Goldberg, there was "less reason here than
in Goldberg to depart from the ordinary principle, established by
our decisions, that something less than an evidentiary hearing is
'3
sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.
Despite its fairly careful analysis, the Court's approach to
weighing the private interest is incomplete and problematic. If the
objective, as the Court's due process calculus suggests, is to compare
the monetary value of the private interests in avoiding wrongful
terminations prior to hearing with the monetary value of the governmental interest in summary termination, the Court should have
computed the total value of terminated SSA disability claims.
Given the current success rate on appeal, that figure might then be
discounted by about 50%.31 This discounted value would also have
Id. at 341.
2'Id. at 342.
Id. at 342 & n.26. According to the 1966 Social Security Survey of the Disabled, the
physically disabled worker's family unit has a median income of $2,836 and median liquid
assets of $940. More recent statistics on the income and assets of disabled workers are not
available. Note, however, that the 1966 survey included persons who considered themselves
disabled but who were not receiving and probably could not qualify for Social Security
disability benefits. According to that same survey, more than three-fifths of the severely
disabled had incomes below $3,000 and over three-fourths had incomes less than $5,000 per
year. About half had incomes below the poverty level as of 1966. See I. Swisher, Sources and
Size of Income of Disabled (Social Security Survey of the Disabled: 1966, Report No. 16, June,
1971).
11 424 U.S. at 343.
3* According to the Operational Analysis of the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals of the
Social Security Administration for the fiscal year 1972, approximately 39% of all decisions
by administrative law judges were favorable to the claimant. By fiscal year 1975 that figure
had risen to 42%. The Supreme Court, using a different statistical base, put the reversal rate
at nearly 60%. 424 U.S. at 346.
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made an interesting comparison with the total value of terminated
welfare claims, discounted by perhaps 75% to reflect the lesser success rate of appellants from adverse welfare determinations." For
purposes of comparing the social loss from erroneous termination of
welfare and disability benefits, the Court might also have wanted
to know the median and mean values of disability benefit claims as
compared with welfare benefit claims. Yet, neither the briefs nor the
Court's opinion discuss these questions.
Rather the Court's approach is subjective and impressionistic.
Its stated concern is the potential desperation resulting from adverse administrative action, a concern that is obviously germane but
that raises some rather severe analytic difficulties. First, the Court
assumes that interpersonal comparisons of utility, or disutility, are
possible-a position which, though intuitively appealing, has no
scientific support." Second and more importantly, the Court assumes that these interpersonal comparisons hold across the total
populations of welfare and disability recipients when it assumes
that disability recipients are less dependent on income support than
welfare recipients. This assumption is buttressed only by the notion
that welfare is for the needy and disability insurance is for prior
taxpayers. The simple rejoinder is that in both cases a recipient's
most important residual asset is his or her human capital; since a
terminated welfare recipient has never been adjudged unable to
perform any substantial gainful activity in any region of the country, he or she might a priori be considered better off than a terminated disability recipient. In fact, any number of circumstances
might make a terminated welfare recipient's plight less desperate
than that of his disabled SSA counterpart,4 2 or vice versa. But any
wholesale assumption in favor of either group so grossly overgeneralizes the positions of individual recipients that it masks grave potential injustice.
B.

The Value of Additional Procedural Safeguards
The Court's analysis of the reliability of existing pretermina-

" The latest figures show that from January to June, 1975, 27% of fair hearing claimants
were successful. DEP'T OF HOUSING, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, FAIR HEARINGS IN PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE 1 (DHEW Pub. No. (SRS) 76-03257, 1976).
" See, e.g., K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 3-6 (1951).
42 The terminated AFDC recipient may have access to home or general relief depending
upon his residence, whereas the disability claimant in a different state or locality may not.
The disability claimant may be totally dependent for his livelihood on the disability payments, whereas the welfare recipient who is terminated may have been receiving a small
AFDC payment to supplement inadequate family earnings.
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tion procedures and the probable value of additional procedural
safeguards is as unsatisfactory as its analysis of the private interest
at stake. The Court reached substantially three conclusions:
(1) that it was dealing with an essentially medical determination,
(2) that oral presentation would add little reliability to the existing
written procedures, and (3) that the statistics on reversal rates at
hearings, although noteworthy, did not by themselves impugn the
reliability of the procedure.
First, the Court characterized the "nature of the relevant inquiry" as essentially a medical assessment of a worker's physical or
mental condition. This assessment, as the Court viewed it, was "a
more sharply focused and easily documented decision than the typical determination of welfare entitlement. 4 3 Pursuing this comparison, the Court suggested that whereas welfare determinations involved issues of witness credibility and veracity, disability determinations turned on "routine, standard and unbiased medical reports by physical specialists."" Relying on its language in Richardson v. Perales, the Court stated that "[t]he spectre of questionable credibility and veracity is not present." 5
The Court then dealt with, and dismissed, the Goldberg decision's requirement of an oral presentation to the decision maker.
While noting that the Goldberg decision had relied on the limited
educational attainment and deficient writing ability of welfare recipients, the Court did not attempt to distinguish disability recipients from welfare recipients on this basis." Rather, the Court emphasized two other aspects of the disability process that suggested
the sensibleness and reliability of a written presentation of evidence. The first was that a disability claimant was likely to have
much more information than a welfare claimant concerning the
precise issues that were relevant to an entitlement decision. Second,
evidence in the disability case, according to the Court, derived pri424 U.S. at 343.
Id. at 344, quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971).
' 424 U.S. at 344, quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 407 (1971).
It seems highly unlikely that the two classes of beneficiaries are substantially different
in terms of those socio-economic factors that relate to their ability to participate in hearings,
either orally or in writing. Again quoting from the 1966 Social Security Survey of the Disabled, "in terms of education and occupation at the onset of disability . . . [c]lose to twothirds had eight years of schooling or less; only about one-fifth completed high school, about
half of the men. . . had been employed at predominantly semi-skilled and unskilled occupations and only about one-sixth had had white collar jobs." L. Haber, The Disabled Beneficiary-A Comparison of Factors Related to Benefit Entitlement (Social Security Survey of the
Disabled: 1966, Report No. 7, June, 1969).
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marily from sources other than the claimant: physicians' written
reports and records, supplemented by X rays and documents reflecting other clinical or laboratory tests. The Court was also impressed that the agency informed the recipient of its tentative assessment and then provided an opportunity to submit additional
written evidence, thus enabling the recipient to challenge directly
the agency's information as well as its tentative conclusions.
The Court was nevertheless troubled, though not ultimately
persuaded, by the apparently high reversal rate (58.6%) for appealed reconsideration decisions, that is, decisions that go to hearing before an administrative law judge. 7 What was unclear, however, was whether the reversal rate should be computed from the
standpoint of appealed reconsideration decisions or from the standpoint of the overall adjudicatory process, including appealed and
unappealed decisions. Under the latter approach, the reversal rate
was only 3.3%.4s Furthermore, the Court was uncertain about the
meaning of the reversal rate in terms of the reliability of initial and
reconsideration decisions, since the "open file" concept in disability
determinations means that the decision at the hearing may be based
on additional or new medical evidence that was unavailable at the
time of the initial or reconsideration decision. 9
Again the Court's analysis is problematic. First, its characterization of the type of decision involved is incomplete. Certainly the
definition of "disability" in the Social Security Act requires that
disability be the result of a determinable physical or mental impairment. But the question whether the complaining party is disabled
often requires the decision maker to translate this medical impairment into functional limitations and to evaluate the effect of those
functional limitations on the claimant's capacity to engage in substantial gainful activity, given his age, education, and work experience. Thus a procedure that begins with routine medical reports
concerning clinical diagnosis and treatment becomes a highly judgmental process requiring at least the following additional determi" 424 U.S. at 346.
Perhaps the most important unanswered question concerning the appeals process in
Social Security disability claims is whether the unappealed decisions differ significantly, on
their merits, from appealed decisions. Many persons who are knowledgeable about the system
through long experience believe that there is little difference between appealed and unappealed denials, save the assertiveness of the claimant. See, e.g., Yourman, Report on a Study
of Social Security Beneficiary Hearings,Appeals, and JudicialReview, in SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., IST SEss., RECENT
STUDIES RELEVANT TO THE DISABILITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS CRISIS

134 (1975).

1' There is no reliable statistical information on the percentage of hearing cases that

involve additional or new evidence.
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nations: (1) the degree to which disease or trauma has produced
impairments, that is, abnormalities in the claimant's physical or
mental structure; (2) the degree to which these impairments result
in activity losses or restrictions, usually characterized as functional
limitations; (3) the degree to which the claimant's impairments
and functional limitations affect the required capacities for the performance of normal roles and activities, including an analysis of
attendant therapeutic limitations, environmental restrictions, energy reserve losses, and psychological overlays; (4) the interaction
of the claimant's age, education, and prior work experience with his
functional limitations and his response to them, and the effect of
this combination of factors on his capacity for work available in the
national economy." The importance of live testimony in this decision process, particularly by the claimant, has been recognized by
several circuit courts of appeal.'
Furthermore, according to recent studies by the staff of the
House Ways and Means Committee,5 2 only 29% of the awards to
those persons who are awarded disability benefits are made on the
basis of medical condition alone. The basis of the remaining decisions to award benefits is either that impairments are functionally
equivalent to those medical conditions which are per se disabling
(45%) or that, although the impairment does not meet or functionally equal the medical listings in the regulations, vocational factors
specific to the individual justify a determination of total disability
(26%).
George Eldridge's fundamental complaint, therefore, might
well be that the state agency was making a "medical" decision when
it should have made a "disability" decision. His concern is not
necessarily with the "veracity" of the medical evidence but rather
with the capacity of a disability adjudicator to make a decision
about his disability without seeing him and his response to his medical problem. If that is Eldridge's claim, the Court's characterization
of the decision as medical and its discussion of the importance of
an oral presentation are rather unresponsive: Eldridge might sensibly claim that his disability could not be reliably determined by an
adjudicator who had not seen and heard him even if, as a general
matter, disability claimants were substantially different socioeco0 See Haber, Identifying the Disabled: Concepts and Methods in the Measurement of
Disability, 1967 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 17, 18-20.
See Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1962).
" DISABILITY INSURANCE-LEGISLATIVE ISSUE PAPER, supra note 10, at 17.
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nomically from welfare recipients-which they are not 53-and even
if the notice of the SSA's preliminary determinations gave a claimant a good idea of the precise issues upon which his case had
turned-which they do not. 4 Three studies by the Social Security
Administration have all confirmed that a face-to-face encounter
with the claimant has a substantial positive correlation with acceptance of the claim. 55
The Court might respond, of course, that the purpose of administrative adjudication is not to give an income maintenance claimant the best chance of winning. The question is whether the procedure he has been accorded gives a reasonable chance of producing
reliable decisions. The Court's approach to the question of reliability, however, is no more thorough than its analysis of the nature of
the decision.
Perhaps the best evidence of reliability is whether the decisions
that are made, through whatever procedures, are in fact accurate.
But what does "accuracy" mean in the disability system? The fact
that over 50% of appealed cases are reversed was not sufficient in
the Court's view to indicate that the SSA's underlying process produces inaccurate decisions. This may be perfectly sensible: not only
might a finding of disability on appeal simply reflect the worsening
of a previously nondisabling impairment, but more fundamentally
there is no external standard for determining whether the initial or
the appeal decision was accurate. There is also reason to believe
that decisions made at the state agency level and at the appeal level
3 See R. DixoN, supra note 15, at 21-23.
1, The notice that George Eldridge received is set out above in relevant part. See note
24 supra. There is no reason to believe that it is more or less informative than the general
run of Social Security disability termination notices. Because that notice failed to inform
Eldridge either of the clinical findings contained in medical reports submitted to the state
agency or of what jobs the state agency believed Eldridge was fit to perform, it adds little
specificity to the statement of the disability standard in the Social Security Act.
55A Social Security Administration study of the effect of face-to-face interviews at the
reconsideration stage conducted from December, 1970 to May, 1971 revealed that the faceto-face interview resulted in an award to the claimant in an additional 20% of cases beyond
those normally reversed at the reconsideration stage. STAFF REPORT, supra note 9, at 240-41.
A restudy conducted from January, 1975 to May, 1976 confirms these findings: 29% of initial
determinations were reversed at the reconsideration stage without a face-to-face interview;
46% of the initial denials were reversed with a face-to-face interview. Statistical study in
author's files (1976). These findings comport with a 1969 study of the hearing process that
compared the reversal rate for cases that went before administrative law judges without a
personal appearance of the claimant and those in which the claimant appeared. In 1968, the
last year for which data were available, appearance of the claimant at the hearing, with or
without representation, increased his chances of a favorable decision by nearly 20%. See Rock
& Berwanger, An Evaluation of the SSA Appeals Process 3 (Progress Report No. 6, March,
1969).
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may differ because the two sets of adjudications do not act wholly
within the same legal framework. The Disability Insurance State
Manual, which attempts to objectify the disability standard in
order to render state disability decisions more consistent, is not used
by the administrative law judges who hold hearings in disability
insurance cases. Instead, these judges apply the statutory standard,
embellished only by the regulatory medical listings-listings that
are almost always irrelevant to cases that reach the hearing stage.
The discrepancy, then, between administrative law judges and state
agency personnel may be one that flows from the difference between
a hierarchical, bureaucratic decision-making system with relatively
specific standards and a hearing process designed to provide individualized justice pursuant to general statutory criteria.
Given the absence of an objective external standard for accuracy and the possible noncomparability of decisions by state agencies and those by administrative law judges, the reliability of state
agency decision making should be measured by some means other
than the percentage of decisions that successfully withstand appeal.
The nearest approximation to an index of accuracy is consistency
in adjudication: if like cases are being treated alike by state agencies, then claimants are at least receiving formal justice through the
existing procedures. In a closed hierarchical structure with no external referents consistency and accuracy tend to merge.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) recently completed a
consistency survey of state agency disability determinations, 6 and

"' The GAO's survey has not yet been printed. Its results are summarized in the following
table.
TABLE

2.-Variation in decisions among the States in 221 Cases
Additional documenta.

tation needed to renApproved claim

State

State of ovkin ..........
A .....................
B .....................
C .....................
D .....................
E .....................
F ......................
G .....................
H .....................
I ......................
J ......................
Federal (BDI
Baltimore) ...........

der decision

Denied claim

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

113
81
104
74
86
91
68
91
99
91
91

51
37
47
34
39
41
31
41
45
41
41

108
71
55
54
54
90
43
53
58
75
54

49
32
25
24
24
41
20
24
26
34
25

(1)
69
62
93
81
40
110
77
64
55
76

31
28
42
37
18
50
35
29
25
34

55

25

59

27

107

48

Decision rendered in all cases.

)
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the results are not encouraging. By random sample the GAO selected 221 SSA and SSI disability claims that had been adjudicated
by a state agency; it then transmitted copies of the claims files to
ten other state agencies and to federal adjudicators in the Bureau
of Disability Insurance in Baltimore. There was significant lack of
agreement among state agencies and between state agencies and the
federal adjudicators. More importantly, in nearly 50% of the cases,
the furnished
state agencies and federal adjudicators believed that
57
documentation was insufficient to reach a decision.
If "accuracy" is meaningless and consistency unachievableor at least unachieved-what does that imply concerning George
Eldridge's claim for an oral evidentiary hearing? It seems doubtful
that such a hearing would make the process more accurate or consistent, for there is still no external standard for accuracy, and de
novo, individualized, oral hearings are hardly an apt control over
inconsistent decisions. But Eldridge's claim may make sense precisely because accuracy and consistency are so elusive in this system. SSA disability adjudications should perhaps be viewed as
really concerned with difficult value judgments-individualized
exemptions from the moral, social, and economic constraints of the
work ethic, determined by a complex of medical, vocational, and
environmental factors as they impinge on particular individuals.
Such adjudications by their very nature elude objective verification and cannot be effectively controlled for consistency. Accordingly, they can be legitimized only by invoking either authority or
consent. In a democracy consent is undoubtedly the preferable
justification. Its procedural approximation would seem to be the
fullest possible participation in the decisional process.
C.

The Public Interest

The cost to the public of providing pretermination hearings is
two-fold: (1) the direct costs of additional hearings, and (2) the
costs of disability benefits paid to current, ineligible recipients
pending a hearing decision. In view of the widely varying estimates
in the Mathews v. Eldridge briefs,5" the Court was unwilling to
DISABILITY INSURANCE-LEGISLATIVE ISSUE PAPER, supra note 10.
1'

In only 32% of the cases were the states in complete agreement on whether the claims

should have been granted or denied. Moreover, in only 156 of the 221 cases was it possible
for a majority of the state agencies to reach agreement on whether to approve or deny the
claim. And, when GAO could find a majority of states in accord on the result in a case, it
found that in 95% of those cases the states disagreed on the rationale for the decision. The
Federal adjudicators agreed with a majority of the states in less than half the cases.
11424 U.S. at 347.
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hazard a guess concerning the magnitude of these costs. It was
content to say that "experience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate costs in terms of
money and administrative burden would not be insubstantial." '
There was no indication of what "experience" the court was relying
on. Thereafter the Court lapsed into speculation about the possibility that increased costs would be paid, somehow, by the deserving
recipients of the program and indulged in generalities concerning
the folly of transplanting judicial-type procedures willy-nilly to
administrative processes. In the end the Court fell back on judicial
self-restraint."0
The Court was perhaps sensible to sidestep the question of the
social costs of pretermination hearings. Apparently no reliable information exists on the motivation of claimants for pursuing appeals
in the Social Security system, or on the impact of Goldberg v. Kelly
on the welfare system. Comparative statistics on requests for pretermination oral hearings under the SSI program are also unavilable.
Thus no one can project the impact of a right to pretermination
hearings on the rate of appeal. Moreover, the final costs would depend on how the Social Security Administration restructured the
hearing process to incorporate a requirement for pretermination
hearings. For example, losses from paying aid pending benefits
might be minimized by speeding up the entire process; and the
reconsideration level in termination cases might be discarded in
favor of an oral conference at the state agency level. Whether such
restructuring would offset the costs engendered by a new incentive
to appeal is wholly problematic.
I.

A VALUE-SENSITIVE

APPROACH TO THE ELDRIDGE ANALYSIS OF DUE

PROCESS

The Supreme Court's analysis in Eldridge is not informed by
systematic attention to any theory of the values underlying due
process review. The approach is implicitly utilitarian but incomplete, and the Court overlooks alternative theories that might have
yielded fruitful inquiry. This section attempts, first, to articulate
the limits of the Court's utilitarian approach, both in Eldridge and
as a general schema for evaluating administrative procedures, and
second, to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of three alternative
theories-individual dignity, equality, and tradition. These theoId.
I'
"

See text at note 8 supra.
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ries, at the level of abstraction here presented, require little critical
justification: they are widely held, respond to strong currents in the
philosophic literature concerning law, politics, and ethics, and are
supported either implicitly or explicitly by the Supreme Court's due
process jurisprudence.'
A.

Utilitarianism

Utility theory suggests that the purpose of decisional procedures-like that of social action generally-is to maximize social
welfare. Indeed, the three-factor analysis enunciated in Eldridge
appears to be a type of utilitarian, social welfare function. That
function first takes into account the social value at stake in a legitimate private claim; it discounts that value by the probability that
it will be preserved through the available administrative proce" In early due process cases the Supreme Court concentrated on tradition. The oft-cited
statement in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877), that the Court's approach to
due process problems should be "by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion,"
epitomizes the conservative, precedent-oriented, historical approach. As governmental functions increased, however, the Court was faced with due process problems that had no compelling historical analogies. If the Court was not to be a continual stumbling block to "progress,"
a more flexible approach was needed. Indeed, the history of due process in the Supreme Court
might be characterized as a continuous search for a theory of due process review that combines the legitimacy of the evolutionary theory with a flexibility that permits adaptation to
contemporary circumstances. Dignitary or natural right, utilitarian, and egalitarian theories
have all been incorporated to this end.
Dignitary ideas, although used occasionally in a supportive role both before 1900 and in
some contemporary cases, were employed most frequently as the primary mode of analysis
from about 1933 through the early 1950s. The proliferation of new government functions
associated with the New Deal legislation and, later, with emergency war measures, stimulated a judicial reaction that was captured in the Court's emphasis on individual rights and
dignitary values. The reactive natural rights style, predicated upon the Justices' perception
of the "fair" solution in each case, had an ad hoc quality that soon became disturbing. The
apparent inconsistency of the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence led Sanford Kadish
in a seminal article to describe the Supreme Court's decisions as in "chaotic array." Kadish,
Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE
L.J. 319 (1957).
In the late 1950s and early 1960s various utilitarian formulations began to supply a
structure for analysis. In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961), for example, the Court, per Mr. Justice Stewart, stated that two factors must be
considered in due process cases: "the precise nature of the government function involved
. . .[and] of the private interest that has been affected by government action." The statement of the utilitarian approach culminates in the Eldridge opinion's three-factor calculus.
Equality as a due process value has received considerable attention in criminal (or quasicriminal) cases, but little outside that area. Perhaps the best example of the explicit use of
equality concerns with respect to an administrative function is found in Ashbacker Radio
Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 330 (1945). There the Court, per Mr. Justice Douglas, stated that
the right to a hearing "becomes an empty thing" unless all parties affected by the process
have an equal opportunity to be heard.
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dures, and it then subtracts from that discounted value the social
cost of introducing additional procedures. When combined with the
institutional posture of judicial self-restraint, utility theory can be
said to yield the following plausible decision-rule: "Void procedures
for lack of due process only when alternative procedures would so
substantially increase social welfare that their rejection seems irrational."
The utilitarian calculus is not, however, without difficulties.
The Eldridge Court conceives of the values of procedure too narrowly: it views the sole purpose of procedural protections as enhancing accuracy, and thus limits its calculus to the benefits or costs
that flow from correct or incorrect decisions. 2 No attention is paid
to "process values" that might inhere in oral proceedings or to the
demoralization costs that may result from the grant-withdrawalgrant-withdrawal sequence to which claimants like Eldridge are
subjected. Perhaps more important, as the Court seeks to make
sense of a calculus in which accuracy is the sole goal of procedure,
it tends erroneously to characterize disability hearings as concerned
almost exclusively with medical impairment and thus concludes
that such hearings involve only medical evidence, whose reliability
would be little enhanced by oral procedure. As applied by the
Eldridge Court the utilitarian calculus tends, as cost-benefit analyses typically do, to "dwarf soft variables" and to ignore complexities and ambiguities.
The problem with a utilitarian calculus is not merely that the
Court may define the relevant costs and benefits too narrowly. However broadly conceived, the calculus asks unanswerable questions.
For example, what is the social value, and the social cost, of continuing disability payments until after an oral hearing for persons
initially determined to be ineligible? Answers to those questions
require a technique for measuring the social value and social cost
of government income transfers, but no such technique exists. Even
if such formidable tasks of social accounting could be accomplished,
the effectiveness of oral hearings in forestalling the losses that result
from erroneous terminations would remain uncertain. In the face of
these pervasive indeterminacies the Eldridge Court was forced to
retreat to a presumption of constitutionality."3
Finally, it is not clear that the utilitarian balancing analysis
asks the constitutionally relevant questions. The due process clause
For a relatively complete development of this approach, see Posner, An Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
" See text at note 8 supra.
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is one of those Bill of Rights protections meant to insure individual
liberty in the face of contrary collective action. Therefore, a collective legislative or administrative decision about procedure, one arguably reflecting the intensity of the contending social values and
representing an optimum position from the contemporary social
perspective, cannot answer the constitutional question of whether
due process has been accorded. A balancing analysis that would
have the Court merely redetermine the question of social utility is
similarly inadequate. There is no reason to believe that the Court
has superior competence or legitimacy as a utilitarian balancer except as it performs its peculiar institutional role of insuring that
libertarian values are considered in the calculus of decision.
Several alternative perspectives on the values served by due
process pervade the Court's jurisprudence,"4 and may provide a
principled basis for due process analysis. These perspectives can
usually be incorporated into a broadly defined utilitarian formula
and are therefore not necessarily antiutilitarian. But they are best
treated separately because they tend to generate inquiries that are
different from a strictly utilitarian approach.
B.

Individual Dignity
The increasingly secular, scientific, and collectivist character of
the modern American state reinforces our propensity to define fairness in the formal, and apparently neutral language of social utility.
Assertions of "natural" or "inalienable" rights seem, by contrast,
somewhat embarrassing. Their ancestry, and therefore their moral
force, are increasingly uncertain.15 Moreover, their role in the history
of the due process clause makes us apprehensive about their eventual reach. It takes no peculiar acuity to see that the tension in
procedural due process cases is the same as that in the now discredited substantive due process jurisprudence-a tension between the
efficacy of the state and the individual's right to freedom from coercion or socially imposed disadvantage.
Yet the popular moral presupposition of individual dignity, and
its political counterpart, self-determination, persist. State coercion
must be legitimized, not only by acceptable substantive policies,
but also by political processes that respond to a democratic morality's demand for participation in decisions affecting individual and
," See note 61 supra.
Is See generally Woodward, The Limits of Legal Realism: An HistoricalPerspective, 54
VA. L. REV. 689 (1968).
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group interests.6 At the level of individual administrative decisions
this demand appears in both the layman's and the lawyer's language as the right to a "hearing" or "to be heard," normally meaning orally and in person.6 7 To accord an individual less when his
property or status is at stake requires justification, not only because
he might contribute to accurate determinations, but also because a
lack of personal participation causes alienation and a loss of that
dignity and self-respect that society properly deems independently
valuable."
The obvious difficulty with a dignitary theory of procedural due
process lies in defining operational limits on the procedural claims
it fosters. In its purest form the theory would suggest that decisions
affecting individual interests should be made only through procedures acceptable to the person affected. This purely subjective standard of procedural due process cannot be adopted: an individual's
claim to a "nonalienating" procedure is not ranked ahead of all
other social values.
The available techniques for limiting the procedural claims
elicited by the dignitary theory, however, either appear arbitrary or
render the theory wholly inoperative. One technique is to curtail the
class of substantive claims in which individuals can be said to have
a right to what they consider an acceptable procedure. The "life,
liberty, or property" language of the due process clause suggests
such a limitation, but experience with this classification of interests
has been disappointing.69 Any standard premised simply on preexisting legal rights renders a claimant's quest for due process, as
such, either unnecessary or hopeless.7 Another technique for confining the dignitary theory is to define "nonalienating" procedure as
any procedure that is formulated democratically. The troublesome
effect of this limitation is that no procedures that are legislatively
" See discussion in E. REDFORD, DEMOCRACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 6-9, 19-22
(1969).
"1 The Supreme Court might decide in particular cases, of course, that even a statutory
provision for "hearing" does not contemplate a requirement of oral presentation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). See also Friendly, Some Kind
of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1270 (1975). I tend, nevertheless, to agree with Professor
Davis that "hearing" implies an oral proceeding. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §
7.01, at 310-11 (Supp. 1970).
1 See generally Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for
"Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1974).
11See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinctionin Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
70 See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164-67 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
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authorized can be said to encroach on individual dignity.7
Notwithstanding its difficulties, the dignitary theory of due
process might have contributed significantly to the Eldridge analysis. The questions of procedural "acceptability" which the theory
poses may initially seem vacuous or at best intuitive, but they suggest a broader sensitivity than the utilitarian factor analysis to the
nature of governmental decisions. Whereas the utilitarian approach
seems to require an estimate of the quantitative value of the claim,
the dignitary approach suggests that the Court develop a qualitative
appraisal of the type of administrative decision involved. While the
disability decision in Eldridge may be narrowly characterized as a
decision about the receipt of money payments, it may also be considered from various qualitative perspectives which seem pertinent
in view of the general structure of the American income-support
system.
That system suggests that a disability decision is a judgment
of considerable social significance, and one that the claimant should
rightly perceive as having a substantial moral content. The major
cash income-support programs 72 determine eligibility, not only on
the basis of simple insufficiency of income, but also, or exclusively,
on the basis of a series of excuses for partial or total nonparticipation in the work force: agedness, childhood, family responsibility,
injury, disability. A grant under any of these programs is an official,
if sometimes grudging, stamp of approval of the claimant's status
as a partially disabled worker or nonworker. It proclaims, in effect,
that those who obtain it have encountered one of the politically
legitimate hazards to self-sufficiency in a market economy. The
recipients, therefore, are entitled to society's support. Conversely,
the denial of an income-maintenance claim implies that the claim
is socially illegitimate, and the claimant, however impecunious, is
not excused from normal work force status.
These moral and status dimensions of the disability decision
" Contractarian theories attempt to provide a comprehensive view of social choice that
is premised on individual dignity and that avoids the twin shoals of subjectivity and majoritarian tyranny. Discussion of current contractarian debate, revolving particularly around the
contributions of John Rawls, would transcend the scope of this article. It may be noted,
however, that the only attempt to make the Rawlsian approach operational with respect to
legal procedures yields only an indication of subjective preferences unencumbered by cost,
and therefore fails to elaborate principles of social choice in terms of Rawls's more general

contractarian scheme. See generally J. THIBAuT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PsyCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975).
72 The major cash income-support programs available in the United States are contained

in the Social Security Act, the statute establishing the Veterans' Assistance programs, and
the state and federal workmen's compensation acts.
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indicate that there is more at stake in disability claims than temporary loss of income.7 3 They also tend to put the disability decision
in a framework that leads away from the superficial conclusion that
disability decisions are a routine matter of evaluating medical evidence. Decisions with substantial "moral worth" connotations are
generally expected to be highly individualized and attentive to
subjective evidence. The adjudication of such issues on the basis of
documents submitted largely by third parties and by adjudicators
who have never confronted the claimant seems inappropriate. Instead, a court approaching an analysis of the disability claims process from the dignitary perspective might emphasize those aspects
of disability decisions that focus on a particular claimant's vocational characteristics, his unique response to his medical condition,
and the ultimate predictive judgment of whether the claimant
should be able to work.
C.

Equality

Justice in a formal philosophical sense is often defined as equality of treatment. In the realm of adjudicatory procedure, a widely
recognized aspect of procedural fairness is equality of opportunity
to be heard. Indeed, insofar as adjudicatory procedure is perceived
to be adversarial and dispute resolving, 7 the degree to which procedures facilitate equal opportunities for the adversaries to influence
the decision may be the most important criterion by which fairness
is evaluated.75
Equality of opportunity is not, however, an exhaustive measure
of procedural due process.76 While equality would seem to require
an unbiased decision maker and identical opportunities to present
evidence and argument, it has little to say concerning the manner
in which evidence and argument are presented. A hearing participant might claim, for example, that oral proceedings, including
cross-examination, would illuminate murky aspects of the case or
produce a truer disclosure of facts; but if this participant's adver'3The Eldridge Court, in distinguishing Goldberg largely on the ground that terminated
welfare recipients were more desperate financially than terminated disability recipients, thus
ignored a very substantial similarity. See text at note 42 supra. The potential for feelings of
demoralization, rejection, or simple righteous indignation seems essentially the same in both
types of cases.
71 See Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1975).
" See generally J. TIBsAUT & L. WALKER, supra note 71.
", For an exhaustive listing of the elements of formal adjudicatory process and a discussion of their applicability in particular contexts, see Friendly, Some Kind of Hearings, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
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sary or other participants are not accorded these procedural rights,
he can hardly claim unequal treatment. Similarly, objection to the
use of material obtained outside the record, but not from a party,
is at most remotely connected with equality of access. A procedure
that divested the directly affected parties of all control over the
process of shaping issues and developing evidence, indeed that
never informed the parties that it had begun, would be "unequal"
only if institutionally biased.77 Yet such a procedure would widely
be perceived as "unfair."
Notions of equality can nevertheless significantly inform the
evaluation of any administrative process. One question we might
ask is whether an investigative procedure is designed in a fashion
that systematically excludes or undervalues evidence that would
tend to support the position of a particular class of parties. If so,
those parties might have a plausible claim that the procedure
treated them unequally. Similarly, in a large-scale inquisitorial process involving many adjudicators, the question that should be posed
is whether like cases receive like attention and like evidentiary development so that the influence of such arbitrary factors as location
are minimized. In order to take such equality issues into account,
we need only to broaden our due process horizons to include elements of procedural fairness beyond those traditionally associated
with adversary proceedings. These two inquiries might have been
pursued fruitfully in Eldridge. First, is the state agency system of
decision making, which is based on documents, particularly disadvantageous for certain classes of claimants? There is some tentative
evidence that it is. 78 Cases such as Eldridge involving muscular or
skeletal disorders, neurological problems, and multiple impairments, including psychological overlays, are widely believed to be
both particularly difficult, due to the subjectivity of the evidence,
and particularly prone to be reversed after oral hearing.
Second, does the inquisitorial process at the state agency level
tend to treat like cases alike? If the GAO's study 79 is indicative, the
answer is decidedly no. According to that study, many, perhaps
" See, e.g., F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL (3d ed. 1956). Kafka gained many of his impressions of
administrative processes as a bureaucrat in an agency dispensing disability benefits. M.
BROD, FRANz KAFKA 79-84 (1970).
15 See W. Popkin, Counsel in the Welfare State: A Statistical and Legal Analysis of the
Role of Representation in Administrative Decision-Making Based on a Study of Five Disability Programs 34, 52-53, 59-61 (1975). (This is a draft report to the Administrative Conference
Committee on Grant and Benefit Programs. It has not been approved by the Committee or
the Conference and represents only the view of its author.)
1' See text and notes at 56-57 supra.
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half, of the decisions are made on the basis of records that other
adjudicators consider so inadequate that a decision could not be
rendered. The relevance of such state agency variance to Eldridge's
claim is twofold: first, it suggests that state agency determinations
are unreliable and that further development at the hearing stage
might substantially enhance their reliability; alternatively, it may
suggest that the hierarchical or bureaucratic model of decision making, with overhead control for consistency, does not accurately describe the Social Security disability system. And if consistency is
not feasible under this system, perhaps the more compelling standard for evaluating the system is the dignitary value of individualized judgment, which, as noted earlier,"0 implies claimant participation.
D. Tradition or Evolution
Judicial reasoning, including reasoning about procedural due
process, is frequently and self-consciously based on custom or precedent. In part, reliance on tradition or "authority" is a court's
institutional defense against illegitimacy in a political democracy.
But tradition serves other values, not the least of which are predictability and economy of effort. More importantly, the inherently
conservative technique of analogy to custom and precedent seems
essential to the evolutionary development and the preservation of
the legal system.' Traditional procedures are legitimate not only
because they represent a set of continuous expectations, but because the body politic has survived their use.
The use of tradition as a guide to fundamental fairness is vulnerable, of course, to objection. Since social and economic forces are
dynamic, the processes and structures that proved functional in one
period will not necessarily serve effectively in the next. Indeed, evolutionary development may as often end in the extinction of a species as in adaptation and survival. For this reason alone tradition
can serve only as a partial guide to judgment.
Furthermore, it may be argued that reasoning by analogy from
traditional procedures does not actually provide a perspective on
1W

See text at notes 66-67 supra.
See generzlly F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE

(1973). This general approach can be
though of as "Burkean," or as representative of the traditional viewpoint of anticode continental thinkers such as Von Savigny. See, e.g., F. O'GORMAN, EDMUND BURKE 45-66 (1973);
F. VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (A.
Hayward trans. 1975).
LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
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the values served by due process. Rather, it is a decisional technique
that requires a specification of the purposes of procedural rules
merely in order that the decision maker may choose from among a
range of authorities or customs the particular authority or custom
most analogous to the procedures being evaluated.
This objection to tradition as a theory of justification is
weighty, but not devastating. What is asserted by an organic or
evolutionary theory is that the purposes of legal rules cannot be fully
known. Put more cogently, while procedural rules, like other legal
rules, should presumably contribute to the maintenance of an effective social order, we cannot expect to know precisely how they do
so and what the long-term effects of changes or revisions might be.
Our constitutional stance should therefore be preservative and incremental, building carefully, by analogy, upon traditional modes
of operation. So viewed, the justification "we have always done it
that way" is not so much a retreat from reasoned and purposive
decision making as a profound acknowledgment of the limits of
instrumental rationality.
Viewed from a traditionalist's perspective, the Supreme Court's
opinion in Eldridge may be said to rely on the traditional proposition that property interests may be divested temporarily without
hearing, provided a subsequent opportunity for contest is afforded.
Goldberg v. Kelly is deemed an exceptional case, from which
Eldridge is distinguished.
Like the Court's utiliarian analysis, this general traditionalist
method seems incomplete. If the premise of that method is that
traditional modes of operation are to provide guidelines, then the
Court should have immediately characterized the legal issue in
order to select the appropriate guidelines. But given the Court's
quite sensible position that administrative functions are to be evaluated individually, how was that characterization to proceed? Presumably, disability payments fall within the general domain of social welfare claims-a domain that is also treated in the Goldberg
decision. Assuming, however, that the Court properly distinguished
Goldberg, analogical analysis is aborted because no other Supreme
Court decision pertaining to social welfare claims seems apt. Nor
could it discover guiding authority in prior administrative practice,
which is based on the now discredited notion that social welfare
benefits are subject to discretionary divestiture. What the Eldridge
Court needed, then, was a more general way of thinking about the
termination of property interests that might apply both to traditional and to novel forms of property.
The beginnings of such an approach might be found in Justice
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Black's dissent in Goldberg," where he analogized the position of a
welfare recipient to the traditional position of a creditor when his
debtor refuses further performance. Normally, in that situation, the
creditor is left with the inconvenience of forgoing receipt of performance while he seeks legal enforcement of an obligation that may or
may not remain due. The majority opinion's implicit response to the
analogy is that a welfare recipient is in a special position: he literally
cannot wait because he depends upon the state's performance for
survival. Given this special circumstance, the Court concludes, the
traditional bearer of the risk of erroneous (or otherwise illicit) nonperformance has a constitutional right to shift that risk to the state,
pending hearing. Given this reading of Goldberg, the Eldridge opinion may be interpreted as concluding simply that the special
Goldberg circumstances did not obtain. Therefore, the traditional
allocation of the risk was acceptable.
Analyzing Goldberg and Eldridge by analogy to traditional
contract-default remedies is valuable because it discourages the
superficial classification of welfare recipients as immediately desperate and of disability recipients as having alternative resources.
A court in equity faced with an analogous issue-a request for a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to insure performance by an obligor-would look to the particular circumstances
of the case to determine whether extraordinary remedies were justified. In so doing, the court would take into account the peculiar
hardship to the plaintiff of nonperformance pending a trial, the
likelihood that he might prevail on the merits, and the burden on
the defendant of requiring maintenance of the status quo.13 The
Social Security Administration, as a matter of due process of law,
might sensibly be required to do the same-or at least to explain its
inability to do so.
A court pursuing an analysis based on traditional contractdefault remedies should also focus on the limitations of that analogy. Contract remedies presume a competitive market in which
alternative obligors are available. This presumption of the availability of alternatives undergirds traditional judicial reluctance to require specific performance pending trial, or indeed after trial. The
party relying on state support is in a quite different position. His
market alternatives have previously been determined to be fore" Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (Black, J., dissenting).
13 See, e.g., Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp.
923 (N.D. Cal. 1970), appeal dismissed, 443 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1971). See generally D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 108-11 (1973).
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closed, and his attachment to a particular income-maintenance
scheme suggests that others are at best not comparable, and at
worst unavailable. While this difference between contract and
income-maintenance claims may not be a sufficient reason for reversing the usual allocation of the risk of error pending a full hearing
in all cases, it comes close to presenting an a fortiori case for
requiring that the individual income-maintenance claimant, like
the contract creditor, be allowed to establish (perhaps by affidavit)
that his is such a case.
CONCLUSION

The preceding discussion has emphasized the way that explicit
attention to a range of values underlying due process of law might
have led the Eldridge Court down analytic paths different from
those that appear in Justice Powell's opinion. The discussion has
largely ignored, however, arguments that would justify the result
that the Court reached in terms of the alternative value theories
here advanced. Those arguments are now set forth.
First, focus on the dignitary aspects of the disability decision
can hardly compel the conclusion that an oral hearing is a constitutional necessity prior to the termination of benefits when a full
hearing is available later. Knowledge that an oral hearing will be
available at some point should certainly lessen disaffection and
alienation. Indeed, Eldridge seemed secure in the knowledge that a
just procedure was available.84 His desire to avoid taking a corrective appeal should not blind us to the support of dignitary values
that the de novo appeal provides.
Second, arguments premised on equality do not necessarily
carry the day for the proponent of prior hearings. The Social Security Administration's attempt to routinize and make consistent
hundreds of thousands of decisions in a nationwide incomemaintenance program can be criticized both for its failures in its
own terms and for its tendency to ignore the way that disability
decisions impinge upon perceptions of individual moral worth. On
balance, however, the program that Congress enacted contains criteria that suggest a desire for both consistency and individualization. No adjudicatory process can avoid tradeoffs between the
pursuit of one or the other of these goals. Thus a procedural structure incorporating (1) decisions by a single state agency based on a
documentary record and subject to hierarchical quality review, fol" See text at note 25 supra.
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lowed by (2) appeal to de novo oral proceedings before independent
administrative law judges, is hardly an irrational approach to the
necessary compromise between consistency and individualization.
Explicit and systematic attention to the values served by a
demand for due process nevertheless remains highly informative in
Eldridge and in general. The use of analogy to traditional procedures might have helped rationalize and systematize a concern for
the "desperation" of claimants that seems as impoverished in
Eldridge as it seems profligate in Goldberg; and the absence in
Eldridge of traditionalist, dignitary, or egalitarian considerations
regarding the disability adjudication process permitted the Court to
overlook questions of both fact and value-questions that, on reflection, seem important. The structure provided by the Court's three
factors is an inadequate guide for analysis because its neutrality
leaves it empty of suggestive value perspectives.
Furthermore, an attempt by the Court to articulate a set of
values that informs due process decision making might provide it
with an acceptable judicial posture from which to review adminstrative procedures. The Goldberg decision's approach to prescribing
due process-specification of the attributes of adjudicatory hearings
by analogy to judicial trial-makes the Court resemble an administrative engineer with an outdated professional education. It is at
once intrusive and ineffectual. 5 Retreating from this stance, the
Eldridge Court relies on the administrator's good faith-an equally
troublesome posture in a political system that depends heavily on
judicial review for the protection of countermajoritarian values.
The path to a more appropriate and successful judicial role may
lie in giving greater attention to the elaboration of the due process
implications of the values that have been discussed. If the Court
provided a structure of values within which procedures would be
reviewed, it could then demand that administrators justify their
processes in terms of the degree to which they support the elaborated value structure. The Court would have to be satisfied that the
administrator had carefully considered the effects of his chosen procedures on the relevant constitutional values and had made reasonable judgments concerning those effects.
A decision that an administrator had not met that standard
would not result in the prescription of a particular adjudicatory
technique as a constitutional, and thereafter virtually immutable,
See generally Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoreticaland
LitigationNotes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication
of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 772 (1974).
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necessity; but rather in a remand to the administrator. In meeting
the Court's objections, the administrator (or legislature) might properly choose between specific amendment and a complete overhaul
of the administrative process. Perhaps more importantly, under a
due process approach that emphasized value rather than technique,
neither the administrator in constructing and justifying his pro-

cesses, nor the Court in reviewing them, would be limited to the
increasingly sterile discussion of whether this or that particular aspect of trial-type procedure is absolutely essential to due process of
law.

